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Abstract: 
This paper critically discusses the use and merits of global indices, in particular, the Global 
Health Security Index or GHSI (Cameron et 2019). The index ranked 195 countries according 
to their expected preparedness in case of a pandemic or other biological threat. The Covid-
19 pandemic provides the background to compare each country's predicted performance 
from the GHSI with the actual performance. In general, there is an inverted relation between 
predicted versus actual performance, i.e. the predicted top performers are among those that 
are the worst hit. Obviously, this reflects poorly on the potential policy uses of the index. 
This paper analyses the reasons for the poor match between prediction and reality in the 
index, and mentions six general observations applying to global indices in this respect. The 
level of abstraction in these global indices builds uncertainties upon uncertainties which 
potentially removes them from the policy needs on the ground. From this, the question is 
raised if the policy community might have better tools for decision making. On the basis of 
data from the INGSA Policy-making Tracker, some simple heuristics are suggested, which 
may be more useful than a global index.  
* * * 
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Why would anyone want to construct a global composite index of anything? The standard 
answer is that it would offer a useful tool for policy design and decision making. In theory, 
the score is easier to understand than a complex concept such as wellbeing or sustainability. 
The next question is then: how can users know if the index is good and useful? Tentatively, 
we might suggest that the index has value if using it leads to better policies and decisions 
than would have been the case without it. However, most global composite indicators are 
never really put to the test, because performance is normally not directly measurable. We 
surmise that the case of the Global Health Security Index (GHSI) [1] may be an exception. 
This index was published in October 2019 after two and a half years of research, and 
contained a ranking of 195 countries with their associated scores indicating their 
preparedness for global epidemics and pandemics. The GHSI aimed to be a key resource in 
the “face of increasing risks of high-consequence and globally catastrophic biological events 
in light of major gaps in international financing for preparedness” [1]. The developers 
“believe that, over time, the GHS Index will spur measurable changes in national health 
security” and sought to “illuminate preparedness and capacity gaps to increase both political 
will and financing to fill them at the national and international levels.” [1] It utilized 140 
questions organized in 6 categories, 34 indicators and 85 sub-indicators, all constructed from 
open-source information. Out of a total possible score of 100, the average for these 
countries was 40.2, ranging between 83.5 to 16.2. Fewer than 7% of the countries are 
ranked as being able to effectively prevent the emergence or release of pathogens. 
How accurate was GHSI? 
Less than half a year later, the novel SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus led to the Covid-19 
pandemic. This gives us now the possibility to compare the previous assessment from the 
index with the actual performance of countries’ health systems. Firstly, we can see how the 
GHSI ranked countries into three levels of preparedness. The United States and the United 
Kingdom top the index at rank 1 and 2 (scoring 83.5 and 77.9), with Sweden (72.2), South 
Korea (70.2) and France (68.1) with high rankings at 7, 9, and 11 respectively.  Then there 
are countries like Germany (66.0), Spain (65.9), Norway (64.9), Italy (56.2), New Zealand 
(54.0) and others which are placed in the middle category of preparedness, apparently not 
so well prepared. Brazil (59.7, rank 22) is ranked slightly better than Singapore (58.7, rank 
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24). Mongolia is at least above the average with a score of 49.5, while Jamaica (29.0, rank 
147) and Fiji (25.7, rank 168) are among those ranked as very poorly prepared.  
For those who have been watching the global spread of Covid-19, the incongruities 
between the GHSI rankings and the case numbers in each country will be obvious. June 2020 
data from the Worldometer website [https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/] shows 
the opposite of what we might expect from the GHSI rankings: The United States, United 
Kingdom, Sweden, and Brazil are the worst hit countries, while other countries have been 
surpassing expectations derived from the index: Germany, Norway, Singapore, New Zealand, 
and Vietnam. This is certainly the case for Jamaica and Fiji, which have virtually eliminated 
Covid-19, but were ranked among the least prepared. Two of the best performing 
economies, Taiwan and Hong Kong, are not even included in the global index. We do note 
that there are some limitations with the use of data aggregators like Worldometer and 
potential issues around the reliability of testing in some countries, but we feel that these 
data are suitable enough for demonstrating the magnitude of the problem. Table 1 shows a 
comparison of 29 selected countries, chosen on the basis of gross household income. This 
subset was chosen as those with the highest household incomes to focus on countries where 
resource limitations in the health care system would not be the primary determinant. A 
small rank difference indicates a close estimate between GHSI and reality, while a large rank 
difference indicates a big gap between expectation and actual performance. Out of 178 
countries, only 20 had a Worldometer ranking within 20 rank positions of their ranking on 
the GHSI.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE, SEE PAGE 11] 
 
Quantifying the expected and actual performance data for these 29 countries invites us to 
look more deeply into why the differences were so large. It is not always obvious what 
should count as performance data – one might pick the number of infections per million 
inhabitants, or as we have, the number of deaths per million people. We think it is generally 
desirable to avoid a high death rate. What we have not done is to break down the total GHSI 
score into its 6 subcategories, which would somewhat complicate the picture. These 
subcategories in the GHSI report are: 
1. Prevention of the emergence or release of pathogens; 
2. Early detection & reporting of epidemics of potential international concern; 
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3. Rapid response to and mitigation of the spread of an epidemic; 
4. Sufficient & robust health system to treat the sick & protect health workers; 
5. Commitments to improving national capacity, financing and adherence to norms; 
6. Overall risk environment and country vulnerability to biological threats. 
Any single country will score differently on these subcategories, such that the GHSI claimed 
to provide more detailed information on where to act in order to improve general 
preparedness. Yet, the total score is what is used for international comparison and ranking, 
and what conveys the most weight in political discussion. In late February, US President 
Donald Trump cited the GHSI to argue that the United States was well prepared for Covid-
19, saying “the United States, we’re rated No. 1” [3]. And here the discrepancy arises most 
clearly with actual performance. 
Why was the index so wrong? 
There have already been several assessments of how the GHSI fared in the light of Covid-
19. All noted significant shortcomings, and Aitken et al [4], based on data from Worldometer 
on 11 April 2020, noted the reversal of relationships. Razavi et al [5] questions the wisdom of 
the ranking system: “ranking countries based on weighted scores across indicators that are 
scored variably and are not directly comparable with one another is problematic”. They 
based this assertion on their criticism that the scoring system is not consistent (some 
indicators score either 0 or 100, while others use the whole range), the use of weightings is 
arbitrary, and the inclusion of some indicators like urbanization, are of questionable validity. 
Chang and McAleer [6] extended the analysis of GHSI by adding other approaches to 
quantify mean values (adding to the arithmetic mean used in GHSI, the geometric and 
harmonic mean values) and saw positive potential in the GHSI, but stressed the significant 
differentiation in the 6 indicators: “Rapid Response and Detection and Reporting have the 
largest impacts” [6]. They also commented on the implicit political bias: “As part of China, 
Hong Kong was not included in the GHS Index as a country, while Taiwan was not included 
undoubtedly for political reasons” [6].  
With the partial exception of the Aitken et al critique, most of the criticism focusses on 
the technical aspects of constructing the composite index, in particular when it comes to 
combining sub-categories to create a total score assigned to the individual countries. It is 
noteworthy, though, that they seem to find pragmatic policy value in the sub-categories, 
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thereby ignoring how these also were constructed from various indicators and sub-
indicators.  
Given the extreme discrepancy between expected and actual performance for most 
countries, one must ask if this failure is due to a deeper inherent weakness in the underlying 
concept of the index, or other contextual factors. For instance, could underperformance be 
due to political decision makers not utilizing their countries’ capabilities or feeling 
overconfident? Could performance exceeding expectations be due to political decision 
makers compensating for the lack of preventative capacity through more stringent 
interventions, perhaps supported by geographical luck? We would argue that it is wrong to 
solely put the blame or praise on the side of politics, when in all of these countries the 
decision-making was presented as evidence-based, and the GHSI purports to capture the 
whole range of relevant, publicly-available facts.  
It is important to note that we have little evidence that the index formed a key part of 
policy making in governments around the world, but that it is clear the index was 
constructed with this intention in mind. Given that the Global Health Security Index was 
obviously meticulously prepared, based on a wealth of data by a large group of international 
experts, we might even generalize the question to now ask whether the production of any 
such global composite indicator – whatever its subject matter – makes any sense at all as a 
strategic decision-making tool.  
We make the following observations in this regard:  
(1) Indices like the GHSI comprise of several layers of specificity, looking for measurable 
(quantifiable) features that are considered essential for higher-level properties. By 
implication, it emerges that higher-level properties are not directly measurable, and that is 
why one seeks to circumvent the problem by using subordinated indicators which indirectly 
contribute to the higher-level property. Typically, these higher-level properties are not 
directly measurable due to their complexity, implying the possibility of diverse emergent and 
unpredictable phenomena.  
(2) The upward process from the concrete to the more abstract implies building 
uncertainties upon uncertainties, without the means to precisely quantify them. In global 
studies, large uncertainties are typically already present through differences in how base 
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local data are registered and counted. Communicating a single index score or rank for each 
country masks the inherent uncertainty and volatility in the measurements.  
(3) Groups of properties that fall under a common concept are presumed to be uniformly 
linear and additive when contributing towards a common concept. This excludes local 
variation in response to the threat / property indexed in the study. One such variation might 
be cultural differences in risk communication. It also ignores interdependencies and mutual 
strengthening or weakening of constitutive properties.  
(4) Constructing a global composite index as a strategic tool in decision-making 
presupposes the existence of a normative benchmark for ideal states. Any such benchmark 
will indirectly introduce a socio-political and cultural bias that does not do justice to the 
diversity of viewpoints among both experts and non-experts. Countries with high compliance 
to imposed rules and regulations may have other needs in terms of preparedness than 
countries with low compliance.  
(5) While solid and comprehensive reporting of the way a global composite indicator was 
constructed may shield one from some academic criticism, the fact remains that users of the 
index, the policy makers, will almost certainly focus on the overall performance figures as 
reflected in the indicator. In the current example, the authors of the GHSI stated that 
“national health security is fundamentally weak around the world” and that “no country is 
fully prepared for epidemics or pandemics, and every country has important gaps to 
address.” [3] But that did not stop an MP in the South African National Assembly from 
claiming “the Global Health Security Index for 2019 Report revealed that South Africa is 
ranked 34 out of 195 countries... this gives confidence that the South African government 
through the national Department of Health is doing all within its power to strengthen its 
health systems to safeguard the public from the outbreak of any other form of infections.” 
[7] The key utility of a global index is ultimately being able to rely on the overall performance 
ranking.  
(6) Breaking down a politically important property into its sub-indicators and other 
elements always runs the risk of leaving out system interactions and interdependencies 
which are not routinely assessed in specific academic disciplines. For instance, while the 
coronavirus pandemic in most countries activated epidemiologists and virologists, in some 
countries it also activated psychologists, economists, social scientists and philosophers. 
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Thus, there is bias already in the framing of the issue, and alternative framings that would 
emerge in a transdisciplinary approach are seldom considered. 
It is by no means surprising that scientific systematization will always include 
uncertainties and will never be completely objective. Facts and values are intertwined in 
science for policy. The framework of post-normal science [8] has stressed this for a long 
time. It has also been pointed out in areas outside of health, that composite indices may be 
misleading and may hide important information in some of its elements. Giampietro and 
Saltelli [9] have raised this issue in regard the global ecological footprint (EF), and this has 
spurred a number of reactions [10, 11, 12]. We also note other composite indices that rely 
on poor proxies, such as the OECD Better Life Index [13] or the Human Development Index 
[14], and indices that rely on subjective perceptions, such as university rankings [15]. The 
danger is that policy decisions made based on flawed indices and rankings are likely to be 
equally flawed. 
What might be better? 
Let us put the question the other way round: could one make sensible and scientifically 
informed policies without these global indicators or index? With the experience of Covid-19 
fresh in our minds, we would venture that good pandemic policies (leaving out the other 
issues for the time being) could be based on sensible data presentation and some simple 
heuristics rather than over-stated modelling with its inherent limitations. One key to 
effective control of the pandemic was acting preventatively at an early stage, and 
implementing counter-measures like widespread testing, lockdown and closing of the 
borders [16]. Taiwan is one of the best examples in this respect: noting the rapid rise of 
infections in neighboring China in late December 2019, it implemented wide-spread testing 
among incoming people, and set in motion a National Health Command Center. It soon 
closed its borders, quarantined all cases, and propagated face masks rapidly. Early detection 
and reaction were the key to controlling the pandemic in many countries, and they showed 
success. Laissez-faire attitudes like in the UK, Sweden, or the USA proved fatal. A UN report 
has this key message: “Act decisively and early to prevent the further spread or quickly 
suppress the transmission of COVID-19 and save lives” [17]. Other writers have already 
noted that simplicity may be a better guide than getting lost in the complexities: “An 
imperative to prioritize simplicity over complexity is at the core of social health” [18]. 
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From our INGSA Policy-Making Tracker project 
[https://www.ingsa.org/covid/policymaking-tracker-landing/], we have been able to analyze 
the interventions taken by over 120 countries and when they took place. From this data, we 
have seen two particular patterns so far. In East Asian countries such as Japan and South 
Korea, governments took swift action to increase the supply of PPE and face masks, and 
began public education campaigns at a very early stage – at least 14 days before the third 
death, avoiding the need for harsh restrictions. In some other developed countries, 
lockdown measures such as limiting gathering sizes, closing schools, limiting non-essential 
movement, and closing borders, were implemented well before the threat of COVID-19 
spiraled out of control. The countries that have fared the worst in terms of deaths per 
million people waited longer before implementing similar policies, as shown in Table 2. A 
similar analytical approach was taken by journalists at POLITICO when comparing lockdown 
measures across Europe [19]. It should be noted that a number of countries with 
fragmented state-level responses were not included in the Table below.  A pattern like this 
obviously does not capture the complexity of the situation – for example, it does not 
incorporate the implementation or enforcement of these policies, nor does it distinguish 
between policies at different scales. And there are always exceptions, but the simple 
heuristic of acting preventatively and quickly is visible in the data. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE, SEE PAGE 12] 
We hypothesize that there are some decision steps that may serve as useful heuristics for 
performing well in a pandemic: 
1) Recognize the threat to your country and the need for a response early; 
2) Agree on a broad societal basis what response strategy is most acceptable for your 
country, such as elimination of the virus within your borders, “flattening the curve”, 
or keeping the occurrence of infections below a predefined damage threshold; 
3) Fill the chosen response strategy with a combination of practical measures 
appropriate to the epidemiological, economical, and socio-cultural circumstances; 
4) Monitor, adjust, or change your chosen strategy according to the predefined goals 
and current data.   
Through further analysis of the INGSA Policy-Making Tracker data, we aim to understand the 
role of timing of interventions, the levels of responses, and understand the sources of 
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evidence and justification behind these approaches. This will allow us to categorize the 
different types of strategies taken by governments around the world, and identify different 
styles of leadership and ideological underpinnings. It is noteworthy that the most obvious 
control mechanism successfully used, border closure, was not seen by the WHO as a key 
response, yet border closure was key to elimination in island states where early closure was 
perhaps easier. However, there is probably no global silver bullet to avoid or contain an 
emerging pandemic. Realizing the diversity of values along with epidemiological, economic 
and cultural considerations into a robust strategy is also a bridge to societal compliance. 
Keep it simple 
We conclude with the hypothesis that in order to be prepared for pandemics or manage 
other crises and global challenges, we may not need more sophistication in the construction 
of global composite indicators; these indices may not be as useful as they purport to be. We 
we may actually do without them to a large extent, and could learn from the past instead, 
recognizing the power of simple heuristics that make sense for the context and point us in 
the right direction.  
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TABLE 1: A selection of 29 countries with the highest gross household income [2]. The 
rankings are reassigned out of 178, based on the countries in both GHSI and Worldometer 
datasets as of 16 June 2020. The table is sorted by the rank difference (Worldometer Rank 
based on the number of deaths per million people - GHSI).  
 
Country GHSI Rank GHS Score 
Worldometer 
Rank Deaths/mil Rank Difference 
United Kingdom 2 77.9 176 618 174 
United States 1 83.5 171 359 170 
Netherlands 3 75.6 170 354 167 
Sweden 7 72.1 173 489 166 
Canada 5 75.3 166 218 161 
France 11 68.2 172 453 161 
Spain 15 65.9 175 580 160 
Belgium 19 61.0 178 834 159 
Denmark 8 70.4 155 103 147 
Ireland 23 59.0 169 346 146 
Germany 14 66.0 158 106 144 
Finland 10 68.7 149 59 139 
Slovenia 12 67.2 143 52 131 
Austria 26 58.5 152 76 126 
Norway 16 64.6 139 45 123 
Luxembourg 67 43.8 162 176 95 
Kuwait 59 46.1 150 71 91 
Czech Republic 42 52.0 131 31 89 
Saudi Arabia 48 49.3 129 30 81 
Israel 54 47.3 133 33 79 
South Korea 9 70.2 66 5 57 
Japan 21 59.8 78 7 57 
Australia 4 75.5 59 4 55 
Qatar 82 41.2 123 28 41 
Bahrain 88 39.4 124 28 36 
Singapore 24 58.7 57 4 33 
New Zealand 36 54.0 62 4 26 
Malta 97 37.3 114 20 17 
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TABLE 2: A selection of countries and policies, highlighting the number of days each policy was implemented since the third death from COVID-
19. The table is sorted by the Worldometer Rank based on the number of deaths per million people.  N/A indicates that this policy had not yet 
been implemented in that country as of 16 June 2020. 
 
    Days since third death when policy intervention was implemented 
Country 
Worldometer 
Rank 
(deaths/mil) 
Deaths per 
million (16 
June 2020) 
Date of Third 
Death from 
COVID-19 
Gathering 
Sizes Limited 
or Events 
Cancelled 
Schools 
Closed 
Non-
essential 
Shops Closed 
Non-
essential 
Movement 
Banned 
Borders 
Closed 
Belgium 178 834 03/11 2 2 7 7 9 
United Kingdom 176 618 03/08 9 15 13 15 N/A 
Spain 175 580 03/06 4 5 8 8 10 
Sweden 173 489 03/16 -5 1 N/A N/A 3 
Netherlands 170 354 03/08 4 8 N/A 15 10 
Denmark 155 103 03/15 -9 -2 3 -2 -1 
Kuwait 150 71 04/14 -36 -44 -31 -23 -32 
Slovenia 143 52 03/23 -16 -7 -7 -3 N/A 
Norway 139 45 03/18 -6 -6 N/A N/A -2 
Israel 133 33 03/24 -13 -12 -9 -5 -6 
Czech Republic 131 31 03/25 -15 -15 -11 -9 -9 
Saudi Arabia 129 30 03/26 -14 -17 -10 -3 -11 
Bahrain 124 28 03/24 -7 -28 2 N/A -6 
Malta 114 20 04/11 -30 -30 -19 N/A -21 
New Zealand 62 4 04/11 -26 -19 -19 -17 -23 
Singapore 57 4 03/29 -3 10 9 N/A -6 
